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The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-
cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution 
concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that 
contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This 
paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test two such predictions. The first 
is that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. 
The second is that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. Although the 
experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of the model closely, our results 
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The infinitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma (IRPD) is frequently used to study the 
conditions for provision of pure public goods, such as curbing global warming.
2 A 
number of applications of this model use the notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium as 
solution concept.
3 
Loosely put, the idea behind renegotiation proofness is that a punishment that 
hurts all players will not be carried out. Unless an agreement is renegotiation-proof, a 
transgressor will be able to escape a threatened punishment by inviting the other players 
to renegotiate, rightfully pointing out that every player gains by skipping the punishment. 
Foreseeing this, a rational decision maker will not enter into an agreement that is 
susceptible to renegotiation. 
Requiring renegotiation proofness in the N-player IRPD entails some rather 
pessimistic predictions about the prospects for effective cooperation. In several models, 
the number of per period contributions in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium is 
considerably smaller than what can be achieved with the weaker restriction of subgame 
perfection. A number of scholars have taken this as a basis for recommending measures 
to enhance cooperation, such as taxes, quotas, regional agreements, trade sanctions, 
technology standards, transfers and other issue linkages.
4 
A prime motivation for our paper follows directly from this literature. We want to 
test some implications of a model upon which strong policy recommendations are based 
(at least indirectly). Arguably, this is perhaps the most legitimate of reasons for conducting 
a policy experiment. We report the results of an experiment designed to examine two 
hypotheses that follow from the N-player IRPD game when weakly renegotiation-proof 
equilibrium is used as solution concept. The first hypothesis is that the higher the cost of 
making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second is that the 
number of cooperators is independent of group size. 
Using experimental data to check the sensibility of equilibrium refinements is not a 
novel idea.
5 However, existing studies deal almost exclusively with one-shot or finitely 
                                                 
2Greenhouse gases mix very quickly and almost perfectly in the atmosphere. As a result, constraining 
emissions of such gases benefits all countries in a non-excludable and non-rival way. This means that 
curbing global warming is a pure public good. Hence, every country faces a free-rider incentive, and all 
countries suffer if no measures are taken to curb climate change. 
  
3The concept was introduced into the study of environmental politics by Barrett (1994, 1999a,b, 2001, 2002, 
2003). Barrett's work has been followed up by a number of others (Asheim et al. 2006, Carraro 1999, 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1998, Ecchia and Mariotti 1998, Enders and Finus 2002, Finus 2001, Finus and 
Rundshagen 1998a,b, Wagner 2001). 
  
4Asheim et al. 2006, Barrett 2001, 2003, Finus 2001, Finus and Rundshagen 1998a,b, Carraro 1999, Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1998, Wagner 2001. 
  
5For instance, the literature includes a number of carefully controlled experiments aimed at evaluating 
various refinements in signalling games. See Banks et al. (1994), Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993, 1995) and Renegotiation Proofness and Climate Agreements: Some Experimental Evidence          3 
 
 
repeated games. Also, many studies only consider two-player games. In particular, the only 
previous study conducting an experimental test of renegotiation proofness in a PD-like 
game uses a two player, two-stage game (Davis and Holt 1999). In contrast, our study 
considers an N-player IRPD game. This is no doubt a more satisfactory approximation to 
most of the theorizing on global public goods provision. 
 
2. The Model 
The model tested in our experiment has N identical players. In every round of the game 
each player must choose to contribute (reduce emissions of greenhouse gases) or abstain 
(not reduce emissions). Let the periodic utility to player i be Di(m)=dm-c if he contributes 
and Bi(m)=bm if he abstains,
6 where d and b are positive constants, c is the cost of 
making a contribution (c>0), and m (m≤N) is the number of players that contribute. For 
simplicity, we assume b=d.
7 
For the stage game to be a PD, we must have that Di(m)<Bi(m) m N, and 
Di(N)>Bi(0). In our linear formulation this entails that c>0 and c>d. 
Assume that all players pursue a strategy called "Penance" (PE).
8 PE instructs a 
participating player to contribute in a given round unless another participating player has 
been the sole deviator from PE in the previous round, in which case the player abstains. 
Non-participating players abstain after any history. The distinction between participating 
and non-participating players is explained below. 
In order to form a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE), a strategy 
vector must satisfy two requirements.
9 First, it must form a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Second, this subgame perfect equilibrium must be renegotiation proof. In any repeated 
game with discounting a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy vector to be 
                                                                                                                                               
Partow and Schotter (1996), Potters and van Winden (1996, 2000). Camerer (2003) provides a thorough 
review and discussion. 
  
6It has been shown that replacing linear utility functions with functions showing decreasing returns from 
cooperation does not change the main predictions of the model (Asheim et al. 2006: Appendix A). 
  
7It has been shown that assuming increasing returns of cooperation (b<d) may (but need not) produce more 
contributions in an WRPE (Barrett 1999). 
  
8See Asheim et al. 2006. 
  
9Several competing concepts of renegotiation-proof equilibrium exist in the literature (see Bergin and 
MacLeod 1993 for a discussion). When we use the concept in this article we always refer to the concept of 
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, formalized for 2x2 games by Farrell and Maskin (1989:330-31), and 
extended to N-person games by Barrett (1994) and by Finus and Rundshagen (1998). 




subgame perfect is that no player can gain by a one-period deviation after some history 
(Abreu 1988:390). 
In our model there are two histories to consider. In the first there is no single 
deviation in the previous period. PE then instructs each player to play contribute. For PE 
to be a best reply given that all other players use PE, every player must (weakly) prefer to 
play contribute, rather than to make a one-period deviation from PE by abstaining. 




Solving for m gives  
   
(1)   m≥[(δ-1)/δ]+(c/δd)                
 
If condition (1) holds, the strategy vector in which all players play PE is a Nash 
equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be subgame perfect, two additional requirements have 
to be met. First, it must be (weakly) profitable for the punishing players to follow through 
with the punishment prescribed by PE. This requirement is fulfilled if d≥2d-c, i.e., if c≥d, 
which is met by assumption in the PD game. Second, the punished player must (weakly) 
prefer to accept the punishment by paying penance (i.e., being the only player who 
contributes) in the following period, rather than to deviate in one more period by 
abstaining. The second requirement is fulfilled if d-c+δ(dm-c)≥d(0)+δ(d-c). Solving for m 
gives (1), which is the binding condition for subgame perfection. 
For the strategy vector in which all players play PE to be a WRPE we must require 
that not all players strictly gain by restarting cooperation immediately after a violation, 
rather than implementing the punishment prescribed by PE. Formally this requires that 
d≥dm-c. Solving for m gives  
   
(2)   (d+c)/d≥m 
 
Combining conditions (1) and (2) gives the following condition for the strategy vector in 
which all players play PE to form an WRPE:  
 
   
(3)   (d+c)/d≥m≥[(δ-1)/δ]+c/δd 
 
By a participating player we understand a player i m that contributes, while a non-
participating player is a player j (N-m) that abstains. Thus the distinction between 
participating and non-participating players is endogenous to the concept of a WRPE. 
                                                 
10Note that we need only compare payoffs in the periods where a deviation from PE occurs. 
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The focus on the PE strategy might be justified in at least two different ways. First, 
PE is arguably better able to sustain stable cooperation than other strategies which have 
received much attention in the repeated-game literature, such as Grim Trigger or Tit-for-
tat. PE sustains cooperation as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. In contrast, 
Grim Trigger only sustains cooperation as a subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e., this 
equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof), and Tit-for-tat only sustains cooperation as a 
Nash equilibrium (i.e., this equilibrium is not even subgame perfect). 
Second, the enforcement mechanism used by PE bears some resemblance to the 
enforcement mechanism used by the Kyoto Protocol. Both mechanisms require that a 
country that is in non-compliance in period t is required to bear a larger share of the 
abatement burden in period t+1. However, whereas Kyoto requires the non-compliant 
country to abate more in period t+1, Penance instructs compliant countries to abate less 
in period t+1. Note that the enforcement mechanisms used by Grim Trigger and Tit-for-
tat do not even remotely resemble Kyoto's enforcement mechanism. 
A number of implications follows from the model outlined above. Our ambition is 




Implication 1: The higher the cost of making a contribution, the more players will 
contribute. 
 
Whenever condition (3) can be satisfied (so that a WRPE with a positive number 
of contributions exists), it imposes a restriction on the number of participating players. 
This number is small if the gap between the payoff curves is narrow and larger if the gap 
is wide. In other words, the number of participating players in equilibrium increases if the 
cost of playing contribute increases. Most readers are likely to find implication 1 strongly 
counterintuitive. For example, economists have emphasized the efficiency of markets for 
tradable emission permits. A market for permits helps reduce abatement costs, which is 
presumed to enhance cooperation. Acting upon this advice, a number of countries and 
states are already operating in such markets. Implication 1 suggests that, if anything, such 
markets tend to reduce the number of countries that are willing to abate. 
 
Implication 2: The number of contributors is independent of group size. 
 
Within the literature on public goods provision, several authors have argued that 
cooperation is likely to be adversely related to group size (e.g., Olson 1965, Chamberlin 
1982, Esteban and Ray 2001). In contrast, if (1) is satisfied, the number of participating 
players in the WRPE depends only on the slopes of the utility curves and the distance 
                                                 
11For a discussion of the prominence of directional predictions (as opposed to point predictions) in the 
social sciences, see Hovi et al. (2003) and Fiorina (1996). 




between them (the cost of making a contribution). In particular, the number of 
contributors does not depend on the overall number of players, meaning that group size 




3. Previous Research 
Theoretical Research 
The idea of a WRPE for repeated games was formulated by Farrell (1983) and formalized 
by Farrell and Maskin (1989) for 2×2 games. In particular, Farrell and Maskin identify the 
restrictions on discounted payoffs imposed by the requirement that a strategy vector is a 
WRPE (1989:335ff.). Van Damme (1989) considers a strategy vector called "Getting 
even" (GE) in an infinitely repeated two-player, symmetric PD game. GE instructs a 
player i to cooperate unless i has played defect more often than any of the other players in 
the past. 
Van Damme demonstrates that the GE vector is a WRPE for sufficiently high 
discount factors. More generally, he shows that the requirement of WRPE does not 
further restrict the set of equilibrium payoffs in this game, compared to the restriction 
imposed by the requirement of subgame perfection.
13 
Barrett (1994) verifies that the strategy vector where all players play GE is also a 
WRPE in the N-person IRPD, provided that the discount factor is arbitrarily close to 1. 
Moreover, he shows that this WRPE places a cap on the number of parties to an 
agreement. Finally, Finus and Rundshagen (1998a) extends this argument to the case 
where discount factors are not arbitrarily close to one. Asheim et al. (2006:97) show that 
PE simplifies GE in ways that are intuitively and analytically appealing. 
 
Experimental Research 
A massive amount of experimental research has been carried out on public goods games, 
of which the Prisoners' Dilemma is one variant. However, almost all such experiments 
consider a fixed number of rounds (either one or several) that is known to the subjects ex 
ante. Reviews of the literature are given by Dawes and Thaler (1988), Ledyard (1995), and 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999:836-9). 
The main findings from this research can be summarized as follows. Even though 
finitely repeated public goods games have a unique equilibrium in which no player 
contributes in any period, single-round experiments average contributions in the interval 
                                                 
12With an alternative concept of collective rationality Barrett (2002) establishes a link between equilibrium 
behaviour and the size of the player set. This alternative concept is less developed in the formal literature 
than the renegotiation-proof equilibrium considered here, and will not be discussed further. 
  
13Thereby proving wrong the conjecture put forward by Farrell (1983) that only repetition of the stage game 
equilibrium of a discounted PD game under an open horizon could be renegotiation proof. 
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40-60 percent. When a public goods game is repeated - usually for 10 or 20 rounds - 
average contributions typically start out as in the one-shot game, but drop over time (even 
though exceptions have been documented) and the final period tends to exhibit low levels 
of cooperation. When restarted, or played by subjects with prior experience from public 
goods games, average contributions start out as before and in general evolve as described. 
Hence, the observed pattern cannot easily be attributed to learning. 
Pre-play communication tends to increase average contribution levels. Moreover, 
increasing the marginal per capita return of a contribution has a strong positive effect on 
average contribution levels. Controlling for this effect, the impact of group size is 
somewhat uncertain, but, if anything, average contribution levels tend to increase with 
increasing group size.
14 High costs (low benefits) of contributing tend to decrease the 
average contribution level, other things being equal.
15 Lumpiness (provision thresholds) 
seem to increase the average level of contributions, but this effect is uncertain. 
A large and growing literature claim that subject pools exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity with respect to other-regarding preferences, and that a sizable fraction of 
subjects act upon such preferences in finite public goods experiments (Camerer 2003, 
Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
16 However, such explanations of observed deviations from a 
model based on self interest, though popular, remain controversial. Samuelson (2005) 
forcefully argue that observed deviations is better viewed as resulting from self-regarding 
players with bounded rationality. 
As far as we know, the only previous study of an indefinitely repeated public goods 
experiment is Roth and Murnighan (1978). This almost complete absence of experiments 
with games of indefinite repetition is remarkable, in light of the fact that the bulk of 
theoretical research has focused on indefinitely repeated games, where equilibrium 
contribution levels generally are higher than in fixed horizon games. Roth and 
Murnighan's main finding is that reducing the continuation probability reduces average 
contributions in the game.
17 
                                                 
14Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) and Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) are seminal studies. 
  
15See especially Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985) and Marwell and Ames (1979). 
  
16Henrich et al. (2004), Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) and Burlando and Hey (1997) demonstrate cultural 
variation in cooperation in public goods games. The differences are ascribed to variations in social 
preferences over societies. The importance of informal social sanctions (naming and blaming) in public 
goods games are demonstrated by Andreoni and Petri (2004), Rege and Telle (2004) and Cinyabugma, Page 
and Putterman (2005). Altruistic punishments in public goods games are investigated by Fehr and Gächter 
(2000, 2002). General overviews of the research on social preferences and public goods games can also be 
found in Gintis et al. (2005), Ledyard (1995), Gächter and Fehr (1999). There even exists some neurological 
evidence from finite public good experiments, indicating that subjects derive utility from mutual cooperation 
in and of itself (Rilling et al. 2002, 2004). 
  
17Unfortunatley the Roth and Murnigham study does not enable us to decide whether contributions tend to 
fall over time in the manner observed in fixed horizon games. 




The aim of Roth and Murnighan is different from ours. They explore whether 
variation in continuation probabilities (discount factors) has an impact on behavior. Costs 
and benefits of the stage game are kept constant over treatments, and the study is limited 
to a two-player game (in which one of the players is an automaton). Furthermore, the 
generality of their results may be questioned on behalf of the reward structure 
implemented. Subjects were rewarded solely by an opportunity to win a fixed sum (10 
USD) in a final game. In our experiment the continuation probability is kept constant, 
while the cost of making a contribution is systematically varied over treatments. Also, we 
study an N-player game (with no automatons) where the player group is varied 
systematically, and rewards are accumulated over all rounds of play. 
Of particular interest for our purposes is the experimental study carried out by 
Davis and Holt (1999). They study a two player, two stage game. In the first stage a 
unique sub-optimal equilibrium exists. The question asked is whether a cooperative 
outcome of the first stage can be supported by threats in the second stage game. Davis 
and Holt vary the structure of threats available in the second stage game, making them 
non-Nash, Pareto-dominated and Pareto-undominated respectively. In WRPE, 
cooperation in the first stage should be largest in the treatment with Pareto-undominated 
threats. Furthermore, cooperation in the first stage should not be supported by non-Nash 
threats. Davis's and Holt's results do not support these conjectures, however. In fact, they 
find that the second stage equilibria are not primary determinants of the rate of 
cooperation in the first stage. Very low rates of cooperation are sometimes observed in 
treatments with access to Pareto-undominated threats, while very high rates of 
cooperation are sometimes observed in treatments with access to non-Nash threats. In 
other words, WRPE does not explain behaviour well in the Davis and Holt design. 
Davis and Holt speculate that "when the game is modified to make the notion of 
punishing clearer, for example, by allowing pre-play communication or by increasing the 
number of periods, participants may be much more sensitive to the structure of 
punishment outcomes" (1999:109). In our experiment there is an indefinite number of 
rounds, in the sense that there is always a positive probability that the game continues at 
least one more round. Even though our experiment did not allow pre-play 
communication, we did introduce a treatment (described below) aimed at solving the 
inherent coordination problems facing our subjects. This treatment might be viewed as a 
coarse substitute for pre-play communication. Interestingly, despite these differences 
between Davis's and Holt's design and our own, our results basically support Davis's and 
Holt's conclusion. 
We do not know of any previous experimental studies designed to test the notion 
of an WRPE in an infinitely repeated PD or public good game. Given the apparent 
enthusiasm for the WRPE concept in the literature, it certainly seems worthwhile to 
attempt to fill this gap. In light of the fact that the concept of WRPE is widely employed 
in theoretical research on a future global climate agreement, experimental confrontations 
seem particularly appropriate. This is so since the Kyoto Protocol has not yet completed Renegotiation Proofness and Climate Agreements: Some Experimental Evidence          9 
 
 
its first commitment period. Testing the implications of theoretical models on field data is 





Our experiment was undertaken over two consecutive days, with 20 students participating 
each day.
19 Subjects were recruited throughout the campus of the University of Oslo. 
More than 50 students signalled an interest in participating. Around half were students in 
political science, whereas the others came from a number of other departments. From the 
set of volunteers, 10 political science students and 10 students from other departments 
were randomly drawn to participate in the experiment each day.
20 
Upon arrival, the students were asked to fill in a short questionnaire pertaining to 
background variables. Together with the questionnaire, the subjects received written 
instructions explaining the details of the experiment. Included in the instructions was a set 
of control questions that enabled us to verify that the students had properly understood 
the structure of the game. Two trial runs (without monetary payoffs) enabled the subjects 
to become familiar with the software. 
The experiment was conducted in a number of sessions. In every session, subjects 
played an N-player IRPD-game with linear payoff functions in groups of either 5 or 10 
subjects. After each round of play, a random draw decided with probability 0.9 that the 
game would proceed to the next round, and with probability 0.1 that the game would stop 
after the current round. The resulting number of rounds varied from 1 to 48, with an 
average of 12.3 rounds. 
Group size, the cost of cooperation, and the information communicated to the 
students were systematically varied. On day 1 the game was played in four groups of five 
subjects. In sessions 1-3 the cost of cooperation was "low," whereas in sessions 4-5, the 
cost was "high." After the fifth session the solution based on the PE strategy was 
explained in some detail to the subjects, and subjects were allowed to ask questions about 
the nature of this solution. Then we ran two new low-cost and two new high-cost sessions. 
On day 2 this basic design was repeated (with a new set of subjects), with two important 
differences. First, the subjects now played in two groups of 10. Second, additional 
                                                 
18As far as we know, the only example of empirical research on the level of cooperation with a global 
climate agreement is Fredriksson and Gaston 2000. They estimate the conditional probability of countries 
ratifying the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The study does not address the content of the 
convention, or the chances that signatories to the convention will eventually comply with it. 
  
19The experiment was conducted using the software Z-tree (Fischbacher 1999).  
 
20In the event that some participants would not show up, we also invited three potential substitutes for each 
day. Only one of these was actually used. 




sessions with a "very high" cost were included both before and after the students were 
informed of the solution based on the PE strategy. 
To make sure that subjects could condition their behavior only on the history of 
the current session (i.e., not those of previous sessions), we implemented a double 
randomization. First, subjects were randomly distributed to groups before each new 
session. Second, subjects were randomly assigned a participant number in the group at the 
beginning of each new session (a number between 1 and 5 in the small group treatment, 
and a number between 1 and 10 in the large group treatment). 
It is well known that the context imposed on an experiment may have a significant 
impact on the results. Scholars have drawn two very different conclusions from this 
observation. One view is that the experimenter should try to impose as little context as 
possible. The competing view is that the idea of context-free experiments is naive, because 
if the experimenter does not impose a particular context, subjects will choose their own, 
leaving the experimenter even less in control (e.g., Loewenstein 1999). In accordance with 
the latter view, the subjects in our experiment were explicitly told in the invitation, in the 
general introduction, and in other instructions, that the purpose of the experiment was to 
test a set of hypotheses derived from a game-theoretic model that tries to identify 
conditions for international cooperation to curb climate change. We made clear to the 
subjects that they would not be informed about the nature of these hypotheses, explaining 
that this information might influence the results. Our findings should be interpreted with 
the context of climate change in mind. Without further research it is difficult to decide to 
what extent generalizations to other contexts can be made.
21 
All subjects received a show-up fee of NOK 300, in addition to the money made 
in the experiment. For most Norwegian students the show-up fee would roughly 
approximate the salary for two hours work. For convenience all costs and rewards were 
denominated in an experimental currency, which was denoted "schillings" in our 
experiment.
22 
The exchange rate of 0.3 NOK to a schilling was made public knowledge at the 
start of the experiment. The latter was done to approximate the assumption of complete 
information in the model. 
In the beginning of every round each subject received either 6, 12 or 21 schillings 
depending on the treatment. They could either keep or contribute (all of) this endowment 
to the provision of a public good. In all sessions the marginal gains of contributing and 
abstaining respectively were kept constant at d=b=3. Thus, a contribution always raised 
every group member's payoff by 3 schillings. Since the minimum cost of a contribution 
was 6 schillings, however, abstaining was invariably a dominant strategy in the stage game. 
                                                 
21Including a separate treatment for context would drastically complicate our design, and was therefore left 
to future research. 
  
22At the time the experiment was carried out, 1 USD bought approximately 7.07 NOK. 
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With a continuation probability of 0.9, condition (3) identifies a WRPE in each of 
the cost treatments.
23 
In the treatment where costs are 6 schilling, condition (3) places m between 2.1 
and 3 inclusive. Since the number of players must be an integer, the WRPE has exactly 3 
players contributing. In the treatment where costs are 12 schillings, condition (3) places m 
between 4.3 and 5 inclusive, so that the WRPE has exactly 5 players contributing. In the 
treatment where costs are 21 schillings, condition (3) places m between 7.7 and 8 inclusive, 
meaning that the WPRE has exactly 8 players contributing.
24 
These various WRPEs give rise to a simple comparative static, from which our 
directional predictions can be derived. 
In the model, information is assumed to be complete and "almost perfect." In a 
game of complete information, the structure of the game (strategy sets and preferences) is 
common knowledge. This assumption is impossible to replicate completely in the 
laboratory. However, the structure of the game was made public knowledge by (i) 
providing all subjects with payoff matrixes and other relevant information about the game, 
(ii) making sure that all participants could observe that all participants received this 
information, and (iii) using control questions to verify that the information was 
understood, as well as announcing in public that everyone had understood. Almost perfect 
information implies that the history of the game up to and including round t - 1 must be 
common knowledge when subjects make their decisions in period t. In order to 
approximate this assumption in the lab, an updated statistic was generated on the screen 
of the subjects' computers before they entered the decision phase of the next round. This 
statistic contained information about the choices of every subject in every previous round 
of the session. The subjects were also reminded of their own monetary payoff in the 
preceding round and the total number of contributions in that round. 
   After entering the decision phase of a new round, all subjects had continued access 
to the complete history of all the subjects' choices in the session up to that round. While 
making decisions, subjects were also reminded of the cost of contributing. In addition, 
each subject had a paper copy of the relevant payoff matrix at hand. 
In the treatment with a random draw of signatories, a list of subject numbers 
matched with each subject's "type" ("Signatory" or "Non-signatory") was presented to the 
subjects within each group before every round of the session. The number of signatories 
(held constant over the session) corresponded to the number of contributors in the 
WRPE (3 signatories for low costs, 5 for high costs and 8 for very high costs). This 
treatment provided subjects with a powerful "focal point", facilitating coordination on a 
set of participating players (i.e. "signatories") that where expected to contribute in the 
                                                 
23In addition to the three WRPE equilibria with positive contributions, playing the equilibrium of the stage 
game (based on the strategy vector "always abstain") is always an WRPE. 
  
24The last equilibrium is of course only relevant for the large group. 




relevant WRPE. During the experiment, the subjects were only allowed to communicate 
through their computers. The idea was that, because the notion of WRPE considered in 
the experiment does not include an explicit theory of communication, subjects should not 
be allowed explicit communication either.
25 
As can be seen, our experiment combines elements from an across-subjects design 
(group size) with elements from a within-subjects design (cost treatments). Conventionally, 
across-subjects designs dominate in experimental economics, although such a dominance 
does not seem to be well founded.
26 A potential drawback of the across-subjects design is 
the risk that comparisons across subjects are blurred by uncontrolled, subject-specific 
differences, pertaining for instance to group heterogeneity in social preferences and 




We present our results in three steps. First, we look at aggregate contribution levels for all 
sessions, conditioned on group size, the cost of contribution, and whether subjects were 
explained the nature of the PE equilibrium. Second, we estimate the probability of an 
individual contribution based on micro data, conditioned on the same variables as in the 
aggregate analysis, and controlling for various cross-sectional and time-dependent 
influences. Finally, we carry out an analysis at the level of group interactions. The 
                                                 
25Views differ as to whether this restriction might influence the external validity of the experiment. On the 
one hand, Barrett (1999) suggests that cheap talk between rounds might facilitate renegotiation-proofness, 
and this conjecture is supported by the findings of at least one recent experimental study (Andersson and 
Wengström 2007). On the other hand, van Damme (1989:207, note 1) claims that "[explicit 
communication]… is irrelevant: Even if no player can articulate the proposal, the logic underlying the 
argument should convince … players not to punish each other (and themselves)." In choosing not to 
include communication as a treatment we are in good company. In particular, the experimental study of 
renegotiation proof equilibrium in two-player, two stage-games by Davis and Holt (1999) does not include 
explicit communication as a treatment. At least two other points are relevant in this context. First, in 
violation of the Nash program, neither Barrett nor Davis and Holt model communicative moves explicitly. 
Because of this, it is arguably still uncertain exactly how such moves would influence equilibrium behavior in 
their models. In other words, our experiment is at least consistent with the formal structure of the model we 
are aiming to test. Second, in our experiment we included treatments with a public signal (the signatories 
draw), which arguably solved the coordination problem that the participants otherwise would have faced. 
These treatments served (at least in part) as compensation for the fact that the subjects were precluded from 
coordinating through pre-play (as well as intra-play) communication.  
 
26Camerer (2003:42) writes: "There is a curious bias against within-subjects designs in experimental 
economics (not so in experimental psychology). I don't know why there is a bias, and I can't think of a 
compelling reason always to eschew such designs. One possible reason is that exposing subjects to multiple 
conditions heightens their sensitivity to the differences in conditions. This hypothesis can be tested, 
however, by comparing results from within- and between-subjects designs, which is rarely done." An 
example of a mixed design where such comparisons can be found is Sutter (2003), where the equilibrium 
prediction is not supported in an across-subjects design, but achieves a fair amount of support in a within-
subjects design. 
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dependent variable is now the average group contributions per round, conditioned on the 
same variables as before. This three-step approach was chosen to ensure that our findings 
are not artefacts of aggregation, but consistent over various levels of analysis. 
 
Aggregate analysis 
Consider tables 1, 2a and 2b. Table 1 shows the percentage of players expected to 
contribute in the relevant WRPE under four different combinations of group size and 
cost of contributing.  
 
 
Table 1: Expected contributions by group size and cost.  
Percentage of players expected to contribute in a WRPE 
  Small group (n=5) 
 
Large group (n=10) 
Low cost  
(6 schillings) 
60 
(3 of 5) 
30 
(3 of 10) 
High cost  
(12 schillings) 
100 
(5 of 5) 
50 
(5 of 10) 
 
 
While, according to implication 2, the absolute number of contributors in a group should 
not vary if costs are kept constant, the percentage of players that contribute should vary. 
In particular, this percentage ought to decrease with increasing group size. This effect is in 
line with one interpretation of Olson's size principle (Olson 1965, Barrett 1999). More 
interesting perhaps, the percentage of players that contribute should increase with 
increasing cost of contributing, holding group size constant. This is the effect suggested in 
implication 1. What are the results of the aggregate analysis? Consider first the case where 
subjects were not given any information about the nature of equilibrium play (and where 
no signatories therefore were drawn). The results are reported in table 2a.  
 
 
Table 2a: Contributions by group size and cost.  
Percent of players who contributed (N=Decisions).  
NO SIGNATORIES 
DRAWN 
Small group (n=5) 
 
Large group (n=10) 

















The table clearly shows that implication 1 is not supported by the data. To the contrary, 
the average percentage of contributions falls with increasing costs of contributions, 
holding group size constant. With a group of five, an average of 42.7 percent of the 
players contribute (17.3 percentage points below the contribution level expected in 
equilibrium) in the low-cost treatment. Moving to the high-cost treatment, contributions 
fall to 17.1 percent on average. With a large group, contributions again fall when going 
from low to high costs, contrary to the model predictions. In this case, the average 
contribution level for low cost is 49.5 percent (19.5 percentage points above the 
contribution level in equilibrium) and drops to 33 percent for high cost. 
In the case of large groups, we also ran sessions with "very high" costs (21 
schillings, not reported in the table). For very high costs the equilibrium level of 
contributing players is 80 percent (8 out of 10 subjects contribute in equilibrium). 
However, the average contribution level observed for this treatment was only 22.7 percent 
(N=340). Thus, increasing the cost from high (12 schillings) to very high (21 schillings), 
reduced the average contribution level by 10.3 percentage points, discrediting implication 
1 further. 
 
Observation 1a: In sessions carried out before subjects were explained the nature of 
equilibrium play - and given clues as to which subjects were expected to contribute in 
equilibrium - average contribution levels fell markedly with rising costs. 
 
Although the PE vector admits only one WRPE with positive contributions in 
each of our experimental controls, this equilibrium can usually be achieved by many 
different combinations of specific subjects as signatories and non-signatories.
27 A possible 
explanation for implication 1a is that the subjects were simply unable to coordinate on 
one particular of the (often) bewilderingly large number of ways to play the equilibrium. 
We therefore conducted a number of sessions in which the subjects (i) were explained the 
nature of the WRPE based on the PE vector, and (ii) an appropriate number of 
"signatories", corresponding to the number of participants (m) in the relevant WRPE, 
were randomly selected at the beginning of each session. In these sessions, the 
administrators de facto solved the coordination problem faced by the subjects. Every 
                                                 
27With low cost there exists - by the binomial formula - 10 ways to play the equilibrium in the small group. 
With low cost and a large group, the number of ways to play the equilibrium increases to 120. With high 
cost, there is one way to play the equilibrium in the small group, while the number of ways to play the 
equilibrium in the large group is 252. If costs are very high (only relevant for the large group), the number of 
ways to play the equilibrium is again 120. Since it is more profitable to be a non- contributor than a 
contributor in equilibrium, the subjects face formidable coordination problems in trying to find a way to 
play the renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The exception is the high-cost, small-group treatment. While in 
this treatment average contribution levels fall short of the equilibrium expectation by far, we do not hold 
this observation against the theory, since it builds on a point and not a directional hypothesis. Inability to 
solve the coordination problems may of course destroy our directional predictions. 
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subject (signatories as well as non-signatories) were of course free to choose as they liked. 
The results from these sessions are reported in table 2b.  
 
 
Table 2b: Contributions by group size and cost.  
Percent of players who contributed (N=Decisions).  
SIGNATORIES 
DRAWN 
Small group (n=5) 
 
Large group (n=10) 














Table 2b shows that implication 1 does not hold even when the subjects are explained the 
nature of the WRPE and the administrators single out the subjects expected to contribute 
in this equilibrium (thereby giving the equilibrium concept considerable help). Again, the 
average number of players that contribute decreases with increasing costs of playing 
contribute, holding group size constant. In small groups, while an average of 54.1 percent 
of the players contributed when costs were low, only 16.4 percent contributed when costs 
were high.
28 
In large groups, the contribution level was 52.4 percent with low costs, and 29.0 
percent with high costs. In short, increasing the cost of making a contribution caused the 
overall level of cooperation to drop. 
In the large group condition, we ran additional sessions with very high costs (21 
schillings). The average contribution level observed for this treatment was only 23.8 
percent (N=240). Thus, increasing the cost from high (12 schillings) to very high (21 
schillings) further reduced the average contribution level by 5.2 percentage points. 
 
Observation 1b: After subjects were told about the WRPE way to play the game - and 
given clues as to which subjects were expected to contribute in equilibrium - average 
contribution levels still fell markedly with increasing costs. 
 
What about implication 2? Observing table 2a and 2b, we see that the average level 
of contributions tends to increase when moving from small to large groups, holding cost 
levels constant. In the low-cost treatment, however, this effect is somewhat ambiguous. If 
no signatories are drawn (table 2a), the contribution level increases by 6.8 percentage 
points when moving from small to large groups. If signatories are drawn (table 2b), 
contribution levels decrease by 1.7 percentage points when moving from small to large 
                                                 
28It may be noticed that this is 5.9 percentage points below the contribution level expected in equilibrium. 




groups. When costs are high, the effect is more pronounced: If no signatories are drawn, 
moving from the small to the large group increases the average level of contribution by 
15.9 percentage points. The comparable number when signatories are drawn is an increase 
of 12.6 percentage points. 
 
 Observation 2: Moving from small to large groups increases the average number of 
contributions markedly if costs are high. If costs are low, the effect of increasing group 
size is ambiguous. 
 
What is clear from observation 2 is that the independence conjectured in 
implication 2 is not observed for large groups. Increasing group size has an effect on the 
average level of contributions, and the effect is strong and positive for high costs, 
implying an interaction between costs and group size. We also note that the tendency 
observed (at least for high costs) goes in the opposite direction of that predicted by Olson 
(1965). 
How can the observed pattern be explained? In our design the marginal per capita 
return is higher in the small group treatment than in the large group treatment. Other 
things being equal, one should therefore - based on previous experiments - expect average 
contributions to be smaller in a large group than in a small group (Ledyard 1995:137-
41;149-55, Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984, Isaac, Walker and Williams 1994). However, 
we observe an effect in the opposite direction. By implication 2, increasing group size 
should not lead to changes in observed behavior. For all of our 10 experimental 
treatments, a non-parametric test (based on the binomial distribution) was carried out. 
The test was designed to check whether the observed distribution of contributions 
differed significantly from the one expected in the WRPE. In all 10 treatments, we tested 
the null hypothesis that the actual distributions correspond to the distribution expected in 
the WRPE. In every case, the null hypothesis was rejected at significance levels at or 
below 0.001. 
 
 Observation 3: The distribution of contributions is significantly different from the ones 
one would expect to see if the players had played the PE vector in support of the relevant 
WRPE. 
 
Analysis of micro data 
We now turn to the results of our micro level analysis. Table 3 shows the estimates of two 
logistical regressions. The equations control for cross-sectional (subject specific and inter-
group specific variation) and time-specific (session numbers and round numbers) variance 
(not reported).
29 
                                                 
29The expected distributions in the renegotiation-proof equilibria are given in table 1 for low and high 
costs, and in the text for very high costs. 
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What we want to estimate is the probability that a subject will play contribute, 
given group size and cost of contribution. Both equations include the variables GROUP 
SIZE, HIGH COST and VERY HIGH COST. The first of these variables is a dummy 
taking the value one if the group is large (N=10), and zero otherwise. The second is a 
dummy taking the value one if costs are high (12 schillings) and zero otherwise. The third 
variable is a dummy scoring one if costs are very high (21 schillings) and zero otherwise. 
The first equation (model 1) contains only cases in which subjects have been told how to 
play the WRPE. The variable TYPE takes the value one if the subject was singled out as a 
signatory and zero otherwise. The second equation (model 2) contains only cases in which 
subjects were not told how to play the WRPE. In this equation the variable TYPE has no 
meaning, since no random draw of signatories was carried out.  
 
Table 3: Dependent variable:  individual decision (contribution=1). Logistical 
regression coefficients (standard errors). Controls for subject dummies, group 
dummies, round numbers and session numbers not reported. 
  Model 1  
 











































3140  1880 
***  p < 0.001 
**    p < 0.05 
*   p < 0.10 
 
 
As can be seen from model 1 and model 2, the regression coefficients for group size and 
cost dummies are highly significant and have signs that are in disagreement with 
implications 1 and 2, controlling for other cross-sectional and time-specific variance.
30  
                                                 
30See Köningstein 1998 for details about the use of dummies to control for cross sectional variance and 




Moving from a small to a large group significantly increases the probability of an 
individual contribution. Furthermore, moving from low to high cost significantly 
decreases the probability of an individual contribution. Finally, moving from low to very 
high cost also significantly decreases the probability of an individual contribution. 
In regards to model 1, we see that solving the coordination problem for the 
subjects - by instructing them how to play the WRPE and drawing signatories - does not 
alter these conclusions. Being drawn as a signatory significantly increases the probability 
of a contribution to the collective good, but the size of the effect is moderate. To provide 
an illustration, we use the small group, low cost, no type draw treatment as a reference 
group. A shift to high costs from this reference group reduces the probability of a 
contribution by .26. In comparison a shift to type draw from this reference group 
increases the probability of a contribution by .04. This is quite remarkable in light of the 
fact that in this experimental treatment the WRPE is given considerable help. Despite this, 
the results offer very little support for implication 1. Giving the model a considerable 
amount of "help" - by explaining to the subjects how to play the WRPE and solving the 
coordination problems involved - does not produce much additional support for the 
central model prediction (implication 1). 
 
Observation 4: Other things being equal, a subject is less likely to contribute, the higher 
the cost of a contribution.  
Observation 5: Other things being equal, a subject is more likely to contribute in a large 
group than in a small group. 
 
Analysis of group interactions 
We now focus on the level of strategic interaction, that is, the group in which the subjects 
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Table 4: Dependent variable: average group contributions per round.  
Unstandardized regression -coefficients (standard errors). 









































2  0.23  0.73 
N  748  748 
***  p < 0.001 
**    p < 0.050 
*   p < 0.100 
 
 
The dependent variable in table 4 is the average percentage of players that contributed in 
each round. As independent variables we use the cost-dummies, the group-size dummy, 
and TYPE as defined above. To account for dynamics, we control for round number. 
Since a Spearman rank correlation test indicated signs of heteroscedasticity, a generalized 
least squares regression (GLS) was run in addition to ordinary least squares (OLS). As can 
be seen, the difference between the two is marginal. 
The results support our previous findings. Moving one step up the cost ladder 
reduces the average fraction of players that contributed by roughly 20 to 30 percentage 
points. Moving from small to large groups increases the average percentage of players that 
contributed by roughly 5 to 10 percentage points. Being explained the nature of the 
WRPE leads to an increase in contributions of roughly the same magnitude. No dynamic 
effects are discernible. 
The latter point is worth elaborating on. In PD games with a fixed horizon, a 
robust experimental finding is that contributions tend to decrease over time, and that free 
riding is especially pronounced in the last few rounds. In our data, there is no such 
tendency of more pronounced free riding towards the end of each session.
31 In fact, there 
                                                 
31Inspecting plots of the development of average contributions within groups supports this conclusion. This 
also holds for our longest sessions in the small group and the large group sessions. The longest session in 




is no particular dynamic pattern at all. The reason may well be precisely that the time 
horizon is not fixed. 
 
Observation 6: Other things being equal, increasing the cost of a contribution reduces 
the average fraction of group members that contribute.  
Observation 7: Other things being equal, increasing group size increases the average 
fraction of group members that contribute. This effect is moderate.  
Observation 8: Group behavior does not change systematically over time.  
Observation 9: Explaining the nature of the WRPE to the subjects, and solving the 
coordination problem for the group, increases the average fraction of group members that 
contribute, other things being equal. This effect is moderate. 
 
A likely comment at this stage is that the results obtained in our experiment might 
be due to the presence of some kind of social preferences. This, however is far from 
evident. There are two main types of social preference models, intentions-based and 
outcome-based. Intentions-based models are problematic in the N-player PD game, where 
it is impossible for a player to reciprocate a particular player's unfriendly (or friendly) 
behavior without also punishing (or rewarding) other players. Intentions-based models 
have so far been worked out only for games in which punishments and rewards can be 
accurately targeted.
32  
What about outcome-based models? The most elaborate models of this kind are 
developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). For the 
parameters in our experiment, however, Bolton and Ockenfels's model rules out stage-
game equilibria where a fraction of the subjects contribute to the public good.
33  
 We are then left with the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (FS). As we have shown 
elsewhere, if discount factors are high enough, the subgame perfect equilibrium behavior 
of FS-players and purely self-regarding players is not likely to be observationally distinct in 
the N-player IRPD (Helland and Hovi 2007).
34 
It still remains to be shown that the same holds true in a WRPE of the N-player 
IRPD. Our conjecture is that it does. For these reasons, we do not believe social 
preferences explain our findings. 
                                                                                                                                               
after 37 rounds. In the experimental literature, conclusions about convergence are in general drawn on the 
basis of observed behaviour over 10 to 20 rounds in fixed horizon games. Our longest sessions are 
considerably longer than this, but convergence is still absent. More interestingly, the longest sessions are 
representative, in the sense that no convergence can be found in any of the other sessions in the experiment 
either. 
  
32Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1998, Charness and Rabin 2002. 
  
33More precisely, for public goods games with N≥2 and a<1 no positive contribution equilibrium exists in 
the Bolton and Ockenfels model. 
  
34More precisely, we show that other-regarding players are also subject to a folk theorem in this game. 




The notion of WRPE is frequently used as a solution concept in non-cooperative models 
of international environmental cooperation in general and climate agreements in particular. 
Requiring WRPE leads to very pessimistic predictions about cooperation in the N-player 
IRPD game. Also, some of these predictions are highly counterintuitive and contradict 
conventional wisdom in the theory of public goods provision. In particular, this is true for 
the predictions that higher costs of making a contribution induce more cooperation, and 
that the number of contributors is independent of group size. 
This paper has reported the results of an experiment designed to test these two 
predictions in a setting that carefully replicates a WRPE in the N-player IRPD game. The 
main findings are that high costs have a strong negative effect, and group size a marked 
(although weaker) positive effect, on cooperation. 
Needless to say, there is a long way from individual behavior in the laboratory to 
governmental decisions on the international scene. The results of experiments such as the 
one reported in this paper should therefore be interpreted with care. Yet one should take 
seriously the fact that our findings are not easily reconciled with the predictions generated 
by the underlying model. Supporting previous experimental research on weak 
renegotiation proofness, our results challenge the empirical relevance of this notion, 
which underlies a good deal of recent theorizing on international climate agreements. 
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